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Introduction
♣
 
Fighting corruption in the customs administration is a major challenge for many African 
governments, as well as for development agencies providing technical assistance. Vast resources 
have been invested in integrity programmes, training and institutional capacity building (de Wulf 
2005). The outcomes of these efforts have in many cases been disappointing. Studies from a number 
of African countries (Chand and Moene 1999; Fjeldstad 2003, 2006; Hadler 2000; Terpker 1999; 
Therkildsen 2004; von Soest 2006) suggest that administrative reforms aiming to enhance revenues 
and curb corruption often were not sustained. According to the Bribe Payers Index 2008, the 
customs administration is perceived by business executives to be one of the most corrupt sectors of 
government in many African countries (TI 2008). This is supported by the Afrobarometer survey, 
covering 18 sub-Saharan African countries, which finds that the most discredited institutions are the 
police and tax administration, including customs (Lavallée et al 2008).1 Case studies from 
individual countries and regions across the continent provide a grim picture of the situation. A 
recent paper in the World Customs Journal by Edward Kafeero concludes that corruption is rampant 
within the East African Community customs. Some stakeholders, he writes, seem to be so much 
used to corruption that they consider it normal. One trader interviewed puts it simply: “You bribe 
Customs and prosper or you stick to the ethical principles and perish” (Kafeero 2008: 71). 
Corresponding observations from other regions are not in short supply. According to Arifari (2006: 
199), professional smugglers in the border regions of Benin and Niger with Nigeria, “…enjoy the 
secret ‘approval’ of customs officers whereby they are left to carry their fraudulent activities 
undisturbed in exchange for regular payments”.  
 
Why have many anti-corruption reforms in customs apparently not succeeded? In this paper I argue 
that integrity reforms have been too focused on reforming formal institutions, and too little attention 
has been paid to the political economy of reform. Customs and tax administrative reforms have 
often been treated as an ‘engineering problem’ - and as such a phenomenon to be addressed through 
‘textbook’ solutions. An assumption underlying the reforms seems to have been that customs 
problems and their solutions can be fully specified in advance, and that the required measures can 
be defined at the outset and implemented on a predictable timetable over a fixed period. This 
accounts for the prescribed and mechanical approach often favoured by donor funded technical 
assistance, featuring quantitative performance targets, redrawing of organisational charts, rewriting 
job descriptions, training courses for customs officers, installation of new systems for human 
resources and financial management systems, etc. Robert Klitgaard (1997) refers to this as the 
‘more approach’ - i.e. more training, more workshops, more equipment, more technical assistance, 
etc. I argue that such strategies may be necessary, but they are not sufficient to building an internal 
culture in customs with a strong mission focus and performance-oriented practices. Especially 
informal clientelistic networks may denigrate what otherwise seem to be well reasoned integrity 
reforms. In many customs administrations, patronage runs through networks grounded on ties of 
kinship and community origin. In such settings, customs officers are torn between compliance with 
abstract bureaucratic norms and concrete expectations of their networks of social belonging. 
Accordingly, policy initiatives should focus more on measures that reduce the possibility or 
                                                     
♣ The author would like to thank Ivar Kolstad and Jessica Schultz for comments on earlier versions of the paper. The 
article is prepared for publication in French in Afrique Contemporaine (2009-2, no. 230), entitled ‘Vers plus d’éthique 
dans les douanes en Afrique subsaharienne’.  
1 Approximately one half of the respondents in the recent Afrobarometer survey consider that “most” or “all” tax officials 
are corrupt. This proportion, however, is 85% in Benin, 66% in Uganda and 60% in Nigeria (Lavallée et al 2008). 
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attraction of favouritism versus acting in the general public interest (Kolstad and Wiig 2009; 
Rothstein and Toerell 2008).  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The next section briefly examines current 
approaches to fighting corruption in customs and their limitations. Thereafter, I discuss impacts of 
patrimonial informal practices and political interventions on the customs administration. The 
subsequent section explores ways to improving the performance of customs in a situation where the 
broader social, political and economic environment as well as the public sector in general is 
seriously detrimental to good performance. The final section concludes.  
Approaches to Anti-Corruption in Customs and their 
Constraints  
Much of the present policy debate on anti-corruption strategies in the revenue administration has at 
its roots the principal-agent (incentive) theory. Klitgaard’s (1988) popularisation of this approach 
has been widely promoted and applied in a number of developing countries during the last decade, 
as reflected in the World Bank’s Customs Modernization Handbook (de Wulf and Sokol 2005). 
Klitgaard’s work has also been used extensively in the development of the World Customs 
Organization (WCO)’s Revised Arusha Declaration on Integrity in Customs, as well as in a range of 
WCO’s integrity-related tools.2  
 
Following Klitgaard (1988), corruption is most likely to occur when agents (customs officers) enjoy 
monopoly power over clients (traders), when agents enjoy discretionary decision power over 
provision of services (for instance, assessments of origin, value and classification of goods), and 
when the level of accountability is low. At the theoretical level, this approach explains how public 
officials almost by necessity have a number of incentives and opportunities for engaging in corrupt 
transactions. At the more practical policy level, the approach indicates that policy instruments may 
be divided into those which influence the number of corrupt opportunities, and those influencing the 
incentives. This includes policy instruments which affect the expected (gross) gain of the corrupt 
act, the probability of being caught, and the size of the penalty if detected. If expected gains of 
corruption are higher than expected costs, the agent will, according to the theory, choose to be 
corrupt. For example, the expected gain for customs officers is higher when they have wide 
discretionary powers and considerable monopoly power in their jobs. The expected probability if 
detected is reduced by decreased accountability.  
 
While the principal-agent-client model is a useful analytical framework to explore incentive 
problems in public institutions, its dependency on the role of the principal reveals one of the 
greatest obstacles to reform. There are (at least) two objections to this approach: First, there may be 
several principals involved, each with incoherent objectives and interests. Second, the principal(s) 
may also be corrupt and not acting in the interests of the society but pursuing his or her narrow self-
interests.  
 
                                                     
2 The international customs community - through the World Customs Organization (WCO) - commenced work in the mid 
to late 1980s to formulate a comprehensive integrity strategy. In 1992 this work resulted in the unanimous adoption by 
WTO members of the Arusha Declaration on Integrity in Customs. Since that time, this declaration has become the 
principal anti-corruption framework for the WCO’s current 174 member customs administrations. In reaction to the slow 
progress with stemming corruption in customs, the WCO called for a comprehensive review of the Declaration and its 
practical implementation in Member administrations. This led to the Revised Arusha Declaration - unanimously endorsed 
by the WCO Council in June 2003 (http://www.wcoomd.org/home_about_us_our_profile.htm). 
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One case of multiple principals is when the formal principal of a public institution (for instance the 
Head of Customs) competes with a number of informal ones (e.g. traditional and/or clientelistic 
networks). In many African societies family and ethnic relations are strong and important (Medard 
2002; Smith 2003). The individual’s reference point and fundamental “circle of trust” remain 
family- and kin-based (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 27). Kin-based informal organisations and ideology 
intrude strongly and directly both in the operations of the bureaucracies and polities. Traditional 
networks may impose heavy constraints on the agents’ actions. Consequently, agents (customs 
officers) may receive different and often contradictory messages and expectations from their 
principals. The effect is severe weakening of the power of the incentive schemes provided to the 
agents. The more the principals’ interests diverge, the more room for the agents’ discretion, and the 
less effective monitoring and control of the agents.3 Further, when the political and administrative 
leaders are corrupt, the agent’s risk of being involved in corruption will be lowered. Corrupt leaders 
will also contribute to reduce the moral and stigma costs connected with corruption. In this case the 
standard principal-agent framework needs to be substantially modified.  
Patronage and Political Interventions in Customs   
In the volume Everyday corruption and the state in Africa Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006) 
argue that politics in Africa must be understood as driven by vertical ties of patronage. The power 
of these ties is maintained by redistributing resources accumulated through “corruption” to 
clientilistic networks according to rules of reciprocity that have their origin in a kinship-based social 
organisation and morality. Kinship and other social relationships of reciprocity are used to mobilise 
affective ties for political and economic purposes (Medard 2000). Such relationships combine moral 
obligation and emotional attachment. They also serve to perpetuate an ethic of appropriate 
redistribution that fuels corruption (Olivier de Sardan 1999). The importance of such ties may be 
growing rather than withering away as the country tries to modernise and democratise in a context 
of economic instability and uncertainty.4 Thus, many people rely on the social connections of their 
extended families to secure admission to schools and to get help in paying school fees, to gain 
employment, obtain business contracts, or benefit from government services.  
 
Political elites also seek to establish principles of mutual aid, of patron-client reciprocity, based on 
kin and family relations. Accordingly, the public sector becomes an instrument for building public 
support, and is critical for the sustenance of those who wield executive power (Olowu 2000: 162). 
Patronage undermines the implementation of policies and rules-of-law more generally, as where the 
distribution of civil-service positions on non-meritocratic criteria results in a civil service less apt 
for the task with which it is charged (Thomas 2007: 735). Meritocratic recruitment and promotion 
are overshadowed by the politics of who knows whom (Kiiza 2006: 15). Hence, clientelistic 
structures and patronage may pervert integrity and modernisation reforms. 
 
Customs officers and managers may remain under strong influence of traditional patterns of social 
relations and kinship, which influence promotions and transfers within the organisation (Arifari 
2006; Fjeldstad 2006). These relations operate at cross purposes to formal bureaucratic structures 
and positions. The informal traditional system rules over the formal “modern” one. Because 
ordinary citizens often perceive that customs officers receive high salaries, extended family 
members expect to get their share of the high wages (and rents acquired by other means). A person 
in a position of power is expected to use that influence to help his or her kin and community of 
                                                     
3 Wilson (1989) and Dixit (1996) provide interesting arguments on the importance of multiple principals to understand 
incentive problems in organisations.  
4 See Susan Rose-Ackerman (1998: 317–323) for a discussion of the role of traditional networks in reform processes. 
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origin (Smith 2003). It is one’s social obligation to help and share. Customs staff are therefore seen 
by their family members and social networks as important potential patrons who have access to 
money, resources, and opportunities that they are morally obliged to share. 
 
In many African communities, to accumulate, even in corrupt ways, is not necessarily perceived to 
be bad in itself. It is accumulation without distribution which is considered unethical (Medard 
2000). Only someone who accumulates can redistribute and be identified as “a man of honour” or 
“a big man.” In an interview, Annebritt Aslund, a former General Commissioner of the Uganda 
Revenue Authority, gave the example of two URA employees from the same family. One of them is 
honest, the other is corrupt. The one who has not accumulated more than he could from his official 
wage, is, according to her, “regarded as a fool by the society” and earns no respect whatsoever 
(Fjeldstad et al 2003: 36). He can not offer needy relatives or friends much assistance. In their eyes 
his un-corrupt attitude is not only foolish but is, in essence, selfish.  
 
It is also in the customs officer’s own interest to help others because he or she might be the one who 
needs help in the next time around. Thus, a manager in the customs administration may “forgive” a 
customs officer who is caught taking bribes or embezzling money, because next time he or she may 
be the one who needs forgiveness. Instead of being fired, common practice in some countries is to 
transfer customs officers detected for corruption to other positions within the revenue 
administration.5 Favours of this kind may also be understood as a way of consolidating and building 
social capital. In other words, customs officers are building up networks made up of family, friends, 
and acquaintances that are based on trust and reciprocity as a way of banking assistance for the 
future. The larger the network, the greater the accumulation of social capital that can be drawn on in 
a future time of need. One possible explanation for the persistent corruption in many customs 
administrations in Africa may be the fact that people at the middle and low end of the political-
economic spectrum are just as involved in vertical networks of patronage as the elite patrons who 
benefit the most.  
 
Why do people continue to depend so greatly on their kin? What motivates people to follow social 
norms and patterns of patronage? The simple answer is that it is rational for the individual. The state 
is perceived to be unreliable when it comes to delivering basic services and assistance through 
formal channels. The use of kinship and other social relationships enables ordinary people to get 
access to resources that they might otherwise be denied (Smith 2003: 707). It is, in part, the very 
demands of the clientelistic networks to deliver public resources, including employment, based on 
moral obligations and affective attachments that make it difficult for officeholders to run offices in 
accordance with modern Weberian principles.6 Hence, customs officers and managers often find 
themselves in a schizophrenic situation. Their administrative and professional legitimacy is derived 
from their training and work in a modern bureaucratic organisation and therefore in its values 
concerning “public service” (Olivier de Sardin 1999:  48). This widespread adherence to abstract 
official norms of Western origin thus coexists with an equally prevalent pattern of behaviour in 
conformity with social norms and family obligations. Many customs officers may be sincerely in 
favour of respecting the public domain and may want the customs bureaucracy to be at the service 
of citizens, but still they participate in everyday actions that reproduce the system that they 
denounce. A spiral is created in which networks of kin and tribe undermine efforts to modernise the 
customs administration and thereby create an ongoing need for these very networks to continue to 
operate. 
                                                     
5 In Niger, for instance, the posting of a customs officer to head office in Niamey is considered a punishment, 
since there is no extra source of income on top of their salaries there (Arifari 2006: 209).  
6 Key elements of a Weberian bureaucracy include meritocratic recruitment, a hierarchical organisation, 
pension systems, a disciplinary procedure, and security of tenure (see Kiiza 2006).  
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Customs is an attractive target for political interference because it offers both relatively well-paid 
jobs and considerable rent-seeking opportunities. Political control over the Customs administration 
can pay high political dividends (Taliercio 2002: 17). Politicians commonly intervene in customs to 
grant favours such as managerial positions and import duty and tax exemptions to supporters or to 
harass political opponents through audits. The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), for instance, has 
been riddled with political interventions in managerial appointments and dismissals. In 1997, the 
President personally intervened in the appointment of the new Commissioner General, although the 
person appointed by the president was not among the candidates listed for interview by the Board 
and was not the preferred candidate of the Minister of Finance (Therkildsen 2004: 80-1). He also 
had close family ties to the President. Accordingly, President Museveni did what other members of 
the elite continuously try to do: influence staffing in the revenue administration. Another case is 
Zambia during the presidency of Frederick Chiluba, where tax exemptions were granted as a favour 
to political supporters, while tax audits and harassment were used against opponents (von Soest 
2006).  
Fighting Corruption in the Context of Patronage 
Fighting corruption in customs administration requires reformers to look beyond the formal 
institutions of the state, to the informal networks of patronage and kinship domination which often 
determine the individual custom officer’s and manager’s behaviour. In these settings integrity 
reforms must include measures that reduce the possibility or attraction of favouritism versus acting 
in the interest of the general public. Policy makers should pursue reform that reduces the realm of 
the partial, and enhances that of the impartial (Kolstad and Wiig 2009). One example of impartiality 
enhancing institutions are functioning institutions of democratic accountability, which curb the 
extent to which a government can secure its power through patronage. This observation is consistent 
with recent research on governance, which stresses impartiality as a key concern (Rothstein and 
Toerell 2008). Such measures should be supplemented with efforts to build an enabling internal 
culture in customs with a strong mission focus.  
 
Norms, as reflected in patronage and social obligations, are liable to discourage the development of 
a modern customs administration. At the same time, experiences from across Africa emphasise the 
particular importance of breaking the influence of kin-based networks on the operations of the 
revenue administration. One suggestion is to introduce rotation systems for the staff, where revenue 
collectors remain only for short periods in the same post (Das-Gupta and Mookherjee 1998). But a 
danger of the rotation system is that the uncertainty which is thereby created for employees may 
result in increased corruption as collectors try to enrich themselves while they are stationed in the 
most “lucrative” posts. The rotation of officials may also give corrupt superiors undue power. For 
instance, they might “sell” assignments to attractive positions or reassign officials to remote stations 
as a punishment for honesty (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 84).7  
 
In Benin, for instance, the customs officers went as far as regulating the duration of different 
postings so as to enable more frequent rotation of personnel. Thus, at the port of Cotonou, the 
country’s “most lucrative” customs service, the average duration of a posting some years back was 
two years (Arifari 2006: 210). The “buyers” of such postings were considered by other customs 
                                                     
7 According to Arifari (2006: 209), the most ‘attractive’ postings in Benin and Senegal are border crossings with a high 
density of transactions, followed by those at the ports, the airports, postings at busy road intersections, and the consumer 
protection postings (mobile squads and anti-smuggling squads). The less lucrative or ‘dry posts’ are generally those with 
almost no contact with service users, such as the head office of customs, which is considered a punishment.   
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officers as being most actively involved in corrupt practices because they needed to recover the 
resources invested or promised in exchange for their lucrative assignments (ibid).8   
 
The scarcity of qualified personnel like auditors and accountants further reduces the potential of 
rotation schemes. Under such conditions it is little wonder that customs performs poorly because its 
behaviour is shaped by conditions over which it has little control. It is difficult to insulate the 
customs administration from contexts in which graft and corruption are normal in public sector 
operations.  
 
Must we conclude then that it is generally impossible to overcome traditional social restraints on the 
development of a professional, modern customs bureaucracy in Africa? If it is true that similar 
conditions were widespread in Western societies before modern public finance management took 
roots, the answer to that question must be negative. Also, observations of contemporary African 
societies suggest that the impact of traditional values and social obligations on the behaviour of 
public officials have fluctuated and can be changed (Platteau 2000). There are customs 
administrations in Africa that perform relatively well despite dauntingly unfavourable contexts and 
an overall poor public sector performance.  
 
The experience of the Zambia Revenue Authority, for instance, suggests that expatriate senior 
advisors and top managers who are in place for a pre-defined and limited period of time can 
contribute to effective change by building integrity and professionalism in the organization through 
systemic changes (de Wulf 2005). Placing expatriates in key management positions might also help 
to reduce the impacts of patronage and predatory authority. Strong expatriate leadership may more 
easily confront political and bureaucratic pressures, and thus provide a “buffer zone” within which 
systemic changes and new forms of staff behaviour are implanted. When the Swedish born 
Commissioner General, Ms. Annebritt Aslund was appointed to head the Uganda Revenue 
Authority in 2001, President Museveni is reported to have remarked that she came from a “very 
distant tribe” (Taliercio 2002). Given tribal interests and the prevalence of patronage in the public 
sector, the President thus indicated that it was necessary to hire an outsider in order to undertake 
serious reform of the tax administration. 
 
Private management of customs administration is raised as a possible approach to break the logic of 
patronage, but such reforms have so far achieved few lasting results. The transfer of skills by 
foreign contractors has been limited and such contracts have been very expensive. For some years, 
the collection of customs revenues in Mozambique was sub-contracted to Crown Agents, a not-for-
profit British company owned by a number of public agencies. From revenue and trade facilitation 
angles the results achieved by this management contract were positive. However, the handover to 
national customs authorities was much slower than expected and corruption remained a major 
problem (de Wulf 2005). The contract with Crown Agents had to be extended several times. The 
major reason for these extensions was that “the national management team was still fragile, because 
a number of management positions had not yet been filled and the restaffing was still not complete” 
(ibid. p. 45). Furthermore, integrity problems were found to be very resilient to change. Customs 
practitioners are therefore questioning the value of outsourcing customs administration.  
 
Outsourcing activities such as valuation and entry processing is risky, since it places the collection 
of government revenue directly into the hands of non-government interests. In countries with a high 
level of corruption, there is no reason to believe that those interests will be any less corrupt. Placing 
private customs personnel in line jobs in operational units may compound the current failure to 
                                                     
8 In an illuminating study of corruption and the state in Africa, Sindzingre (1994) observes that parallel organisations are 
created within the bureaucratic organization, in which posts are valued essentially on the basis of the illicit gains to which 
they provide access.  
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manage and, thus, entrench the problems. I agree with de Wulf (2005) that it is too early to provide 
a final verdict of the sustainability of such reforms. However, new initiatives along these lines 
should take local circumstances into account, including the availability of trained local staff. 
Furthermore, any management contract should contain clear milestones for the transfer to national 
customs authorities, which is a precondition for the sustainability of the reform.  
Political will and impartiality enhancing institutions  
Customs and tax administrative reforms often are highly political processes that will inevitably pose 
a threat to important domestic stakeholders. They take time to achieve and are often contested. The 
successful implementation of such reforms requires political will and support from the highest level 
of government (Tanzi and Pellechio 1997). Customs reforms are unlikely to succeed if the main 
source of energy and leadership comes from the outside. Donors cannot play a leading role nor 
dictate the content, pace, and direction of administrative reforms. An important reason why many 
anti-corruption efforts have been ineffective has been the unwillingness of governments to 
wholeheartedly implement the reform. Integrity reforms have been too focused on reforming formal 
institutions, and too little attention has been paid to the political economy of reform (Kolstad et al 
2009). Elites typically only support reform processes that do not undermine their ability to retain 
power and will instrumentalise reform processes that do not serve this purpose. This calls for anti-
corruption efforts based on thorough analysis of the political economy of the country, in order to 
understand the interests and incentives of key players. Moreover, these perspectives highlight that 
integrity reforms in customs are inherently political, and cannot therefore be addressed through 
technical approaches alone.  
 
In this perspective, customs reforms should address shortcomings in the accountability environment 
within which the customs administration operates. Consequently, there is a need to focus more on 
measures to strengthening of civil society, business and trading associations, and the media. 
Reformers must have an appreciation of factors such as key accountability institutions’ access to 
information about revenue collection (what has been collected from whom, where and at what 
costs), and capacity to analyse information in order to place demands for better performance. Wide 
dissemination of information that allows citizens to monitor revenue collection and public 
expenditures, including online budgets with information on how public revenues are spent, may 
have a powerful and positive impact on the attitudes and behaviour of both customs officers and 
traders.9  
 
Attempts to strengthen the environment for customs and tax administration in this direction are 
already discernable (von Soest 2008). The South African Revenue Services has used the media to 
highlight success and “name and shame” evaders. This has resulted in a shifting of incentives for 
non-compliance (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). Further, the British Department for International 
Development (DFID) has supported capacity building of civil society to better engage on tax issues 
in Zambia. In Tanzania, Swedish Sida has supported business associations to enhance their 
expertise on taxation, anti-corruption and compliance. These more holistic approaches are 
promising routes for improving the effectiveness of donor support to customs and tax administrative 
reforms. However, from the corruption literature it emerges that each of these approaches is likely 
to be effective only under certain conditions (Kolstad et al 2009). The effectiveness of civil society 
in addressing corruption depends on its capacity to acquire, process and act on information of 
                                                     
9 One example is the Missouri Accountability Portal (MAP). The online site is presented to the citizens of the state of 
Missouri, USA, as a single point of reference to review how their money is being spent and other pertinent information 
related to the enforcement of government programmes. Browsing the MAP site citizens are able to view information about 
state agency expenditures, the distribution of economic development tax credits and state employee pay information. The 
data on the MAP site is updated each business day. http://mapyourtaxes.mo.gov/MAP/Portal/ 
CMI WORKING PAPER THE PURSUIT OF INTEGRITY IN CUSTOMS WP 2009: 8 
 
 8 
government misconduct, and their inclination to act, which depends on the type of misconduct 
uncovered and the extent to which civil society is dependent on the government. Hence, Szeftel 
(1998) argues that it is difficult to believe that the role of controller and critic of public affairs will 
be assumed by a civil society comprising NGOs based on external sponsorship and run by senior 
civil servants or their relatives. This underlines the context-sensitivity of reform approaches.  
Establishing constructive client-customs relations 
Most corrupt transactions which occur within the customs environment involve the active or passive 
participation of the private sector (McLinden 2005: 87). Thus, the private sector must be actively 
involved in and committed to identifying and implementing practical solutions to fight corruption. 
Some observers conclude that a lack of a taxpaying “culture” is the largest obstacle to building a 
firm long-term revenue base in Africa. The opposite may, however, also be the case: as long as the 
“culture” of the revenue administration, including customs, is perceived to be influenced by 
sectarianism, nepotism, and corruption, it is unlikely to contribute to the fostering of a more 
conducive duty- and taxpaying culture. Despite quite comprehensive changes in the duty structure 
(rates and bases) in recent years, the customs system in many African countries is still complicated 
and the exemption regime, in particular, is non-transparent (Mansour 2008; Nathan Associates 
2004). Customs legislation is often unclear and causes random and partly ad hoc collection 
procedures. Assessors have in many cases wide discretionary powers to interpret the customs acts, 
for instance to allow or disallow expenses or charges, or to exempt items from import duties. These 
factors, combined with a perception of limited tangible benefits in return for duties paid, may 
legitimate non-compliance by traders.  
 
In such circumstances it is not surprising that payment of customs duties takes place in an 
atmosphere of distrust and fear between traders and customs officers. Extensive use of force is often 
required to collect revenues. This is exemplified by the use of special military units to enforce 
duties and fight smuggling in Uganda (Therkildsen 2004), and extortion by Senegalese customs 
officers escorting goods through customs (Arifari 2006).10 Thus, the government’s credible 
commitment about the use of duties and tax revenues and its procedures to design and implement 
policy non-arbitrarily are crucial to gain legitimacy. The credibility or trustworthiness of the 
customs administration’s sanctions against defaulters is also important in this context (Slemrod 
2003). Reforms of customs legislation and collection procedures, including measures to improve 
transparency in the client-customs officer relations, should therefore take place concurrently to 
reduce opportunities for corruption and the demand for corrupt services. When the government 
decides what measures to take as part of its customs reform program, it should bear in mind 
the state of the economy and the resources at hand. Many African countries have neither the 
political capital nor the administrative capacity to sustain more than a limited range of 
concurrent initiatives. But an incremental process of change can add up to a radical 
transformation if it is sustained for long enough.  
Building an enabling internal culture in customs  
Encouraging the development of a positive organisational culture may be an important way of 
improving the performance of customs in a situation where the broader environment, including the 
public sector in general, discourages good performance. If the enabling environment is weak, 
                                                     
10 According to Arifari (2006: 201), traders in Senegal are willing to do anything to avoid escort operations, since 
Customs officers appear to use the escort process as a threat to pressurise traders to “negotiate” with them. The threat is 
made, for example, when a customs post is “unable” to clear certain quantities of goods, and the goods would have to be 
sent to another post that can process the transaction, implying significant additional costs and time lost for the trader. 
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managers tend to drive performance. Therefore, internal leadership and culture are likely to be keys 
to establishing meritocratic and performance-oriented organisational behaviour in circumstances 
where the formal political and administrative institutions are weak. In a study of 29 organisations in 
six countries Grindle (1997) found that public organisations with higher salaries paid to their staff 
did not perform better than public organisations which conformed to the low general public sector 
remuneration scales.11 Instead, good-performers had well-defined missions, where the employees 
internalised the organisations goals and saw themselves as vital contributors to their 
accomplishment (ibid, p. 486). Effective managerial practice and high expectations about employee 
performance were factors that led organisations to perform well, while some autonomy in personnel 
matters allowed a mission to be identified and enabled skilled managers to have some room to 
manoeuvre in setting standards for their organisations. This underscores the importance of 
leadership styles and internal performance management practices that focus on results.  
 
Accordingly, a reasonable hypothesis would be that if the customs administration was given more 
real autonomy in personnel matters, this would contribute to greater capacity to set performance 
standards for its employees and hold them accountable to the organisation for meeting those 
standards. Autonomy in personnel matters can here be understood as a facilitating condition that 
provides the customs and its managers with the ability to build cultures that allow the organisation 
to rise above the norm for the public sector in the country (Grindle 1997: 488). Required measures 
would include a rigorously planned and executed re-staffing process, also at the senior management 
levels, and introduction of human resources policies relating to transparent recruitment, adequate 
remuneration, pension/retirement schemes, etc. Such measures ought to take place before 
proceeding with traditional forms of technical assistance such as the design and implementation of 
integrated computer systems, organisation of formal training courses and on-the-job training, and 
process re-engineering in a wide range of areas, including better forms and filing, auditing and 
management of revenues, taxpayer education programs, and so on. The experiences with the latter 
forms of technical assistance for revenue enhancement and capacity building in revenue 
administrations are dubious in Africa. 
 
Strong leadership of the customs administration is essential for overcoming the political and 
bureaucratic obstacles that confront customs. This often requires a better demarcation of the roles of 
and responsibilities between the Ministry of Finance and customs. Micro-management by the 
Ministry of Finance in day-to-day operations must therefore be addressed. Such measures do not 
imply the end of mutual cooperation between Customs and the Ministry of Finance. The revenue 
administration possesses unique datasets on international trade, revenue bases, etc. and this 
information is essential for improving duty and tax policy and legislation. But, the role of the 
Ministry in formulating and designing revenue policy, and the responsibility of the revenue 
administration to implement this policy, must be unambiguous and mutually respected. 
 
Job-security for top managers in customs is particularly important in this respect. There are reasons 
to believe that job uncertainty has contributed to the observed high level corruption in some 
customs administrations as managers try to enrich themselves while they are in position to do so. 
For instance, changes at the top level have been pervasive in Niger where the customs authority 
went through five directors general between 1995 and 1999 (Arifari 2006: 210). The Uganda 
Revenue Authority has also experienced high turnover of top managers. This may help explain 
corruption at the managerial level, in spite of the fact that the top managers often are among the best 
paid public officials in the country, even excluding their tax-free benefits such as housing and 
transport (Mitala 2001). 
                                                     
11 The six case countries were Bolivia, Central African Republic, Ghana, Morocco, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania.   
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Fair remuneration  
It is important to provide appropriate conditions of employment and remuneration that includes 
rewards for good performance, and that can sustain a reasonable standard of living (Ferreira et al 
2007). Indeed, severe penalties applied to breaches of a code of conduct are more likely to be 
accepted in circumstances where the difficult working environment and required levels of integrity 
are recognised in the base level of remuneration. Remuneration should be geared to take into 
account the sometimes dangerous and difficult working conditions and associated hardships faced 
by customs officers particularly in remote border stations (McLinden 2005). In such circumstances 
it is likely to be demoralising if customs officers are paid less than, for instance, border police 
posted at the same locations and performing relatively similar duties. However, one lesson from 
customs administrations in Africa is that even with relatively respectable salaries and working 
conditions, corruption may thrive (Fjeldstad et al 2003). Pay level is only one of several factors 
affecting the behaviour of customs officers. In an environment where the demand for corrupt 
services is extensive and monitoring ineffective, wage increases may end up functioning as an extra 
bonus on top of the bribes taken by corrupt officers.  
 
Economic research on human behaviour indicates that reformers and economists have an inclination 
to exaggerate the impact of monetary incentives because of an overly narrow understanding of 
intrinsic motivation and group dynamics (Frey 1997). However, the failure of reforms that stress 
monetary rewards and incentives may have a more straightforward explanation. Because of the 
importance of family networks, increased pay rates may imply more extensive social obligations, 
and in some cases actually result in a net loss to the individual. This state of affairs can develop into 
a vicious circle with higher wages leading to more corruption because the customs officer has to 
make up for the loss caused by such obligations. An outsider might conclude that officials lack 
intrinsic motivation to perform well and do not respond to incentives. But a more careful study of 
the situation would instead conclude that the customs officers are responding very well to monetary 
incentives in a situation where higher nominal pay actually makes the official poorer. This might be 
a reason for the popularity of in-kind benefits among civil servants, which may be harder to share 
with one’s kin (Platteau 2000: 208-11). 
 
The degree of audit intensity may determine the effectiveness of the wage level as an anti-
corruption tool. Research has found the effects of higher wages on corruption - when audit levels 
are low and corruption high - to be zero, while they are negative when audit and corruption levels 
are intermediate (Besley and McLaren 1993). In settings where the auditing intensity is high and the 
corruption level is low, the effect of higher wages on corruption is found to be positive but low. 
These results imply that wage incentives should be linked to and not isolated from other measures. 
Positive incentives should be complemented by negative incentives. “Carrots and sticks” should be 
viewed as complementary tools in the fight against corruption. This dual strategy is also 
recommended in anti-corruption strategies developed by the World Bank and the World Customs 
Organization. 
Concluding Remarks  
Fighting corruption in customs requires reformers to look beyond the formal structures of the state, 
to the informal networks of patronage and social domination which often determine the behaviour 
of customs officers and also how political power is actually exercised in Africa. There exist, 
however, a dilemma about how far and how to push Weberian institutional logic at the cost of 
disrupting informal clientelistic networks (Goldsmith 2005: 28). Further, there is a need for more 
robust analysis of country and local contexts. Information and data systems for assessing integrity 
problems in customs and monitoring progress of anti-corruption reforms are generally weak. 
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Although reformers dutifully repeat the mantra of “no one size fits all,” guidance on what pace of 
progress to expect, given the initial conditions in a country, has yet to be developed (WCO 2008).  
 
Expectations about what customs modernisation reforms in sub-Saharan Africa can achieve in the 
short run have been especially difficult to manage. It took centuries for Western countries to 
develop reasonably effective customs administrations. Countries in Africa attempt to achieve this in 
a couple of decades. It is therefore not surprising that the record to date has been full of 
disappointments. Sustainable change demands sustained effort, commitment and leadership over a 
long time. Mistakes and setbacks are a normal and inevitable part of the process. The big challenge 
is to use failures as learning opportunities, rather than as excuses for abolishing reforms.  
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SUMMARY
This paper examines recent experiences from sub-Saharan Africa in combating corruption 
in customs. It argues that integrity reforms have been too focused on reforming 
formal institutions, and too little attention has been paid to the political economy 
of reforms and the role of informal institutions. In many customs administrations 
patronage runs through networks grounded on ties of kinship and community origin. 
Patronage undermines the implementation of policies and rules-of-law more generally. 
Opportunities for accessing illegal income tend to become institutionalised, leading 
to the creation of parallel organisations within customs, in which posts are valued 
essentially on the basis of the illicit gains to which they provide access. In such settings, 
customs offi cers are torn between compliance with abstract bureaucratic norms 
and concrete expectations of their networks of social belonging. Accordingly, policy 
initiatives should focus more on measures that reduce the possibility or attraction of 
favouritism versus acting in the general public interest. This calls for anti-corruption 
efforts based on thorough analysis of the political economy of customs, in order to 
understand the interests and incentives of key players
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